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Abstract 
 
Balkan countries are undergoing a system transformation process structured by 
democracy and free market economy of the neoliberal model, large outside snow-
ball driven accompanied by the spirit of triumphalism of freedom over slavery, of 
democracy over totalitarianism, and of free market (of neoliberal model) over 
socialism. The primary concern appears transformation as an act, with less 
attention paid to the quality, the substance and even less to the outputs of it. As the 
transformation enters into its third decade, on the horizon still appears a wide gap 
between the expectations and the fruits of transformation tasted by citizens. 
Obviously, each Balkan country concerned here has its own peculiarities, from 
where can be drawn the explanation for the development of this gap. However, the 
paper argues that among the major explanations of generalisability value, is the 
incompatibility of simultaneity of democracy and neoliberalism during system 
transformation. Neoliberalism is challenging the institutional structural efficiency, 
while at the society level it is producing a social milieu not conducive for 
development of democratic consolidation.  
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Introduction 
 
The collapse of the communist iron curtain in the former socialist Europe, usually 
marked with civil society protest in Poland and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
opened up a marvellous and historical chance to bouquet the wind of freedom and 
democracy blown all over post-communist Europe including Balkan countries1 in 
snow-ball approach. This marked the beginning of system transformation (Merkel, 
1999)2. The high domestic enthusiasm and eagerness for transition to freedom from 
                                                          
1 In this paper Balkan states are referred to the states that emerged from former socialist space in the 
Balkans.  
2 This paper will be based the Merkel’s categorization of democratization period, generally called 
system transformation, comprised of the three steps: from the lost of legitimacy and collapse of former 
regimes, up to installation of democratic and free market institutions as the second phase of system 
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chains of communism and democracy that attributed the system transformation in 
the Balkans was strongly complimented, supported and pushed forward by the 
democracies of the world, perceiving it as a historic change and an opportunity to 
extend the space of freedom and democracy in the world covering Balkan countries 
as part of democratic and liberal world. This echo was best illustrated and 
articulated in the Fukuyama thesis “the end of history”, signifying the triumph of 
democracy and free market economy over communism and socialist economic 
system. Based on this spirit of system transformation, appears to have been 
developed the main streams of theories of democratization (Przeworski, 1986; 
Przeworski, 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), focusing on the actors of 
democratization, and agents needed to be trusted with the system transformation, 
leaving aside and ignoring theoretical consideration for structural and societal 
requirements for democratization (Lipset, 1959; Lipset, et.al., 1993; Rueschemeyer 
et.al.., 1992) to take place and democracy be enrooted3. This enthusiastic and 
idealistic, or to an extent even holistic approach of the system transformation, 
principally explains the challenges, complexity and uneasiness still undergoing in 
the Balkan new democracies. It appears that the process of system transformation 
has gone off course from a rationality of transformation, sliding to a sort of more 
dogmatic and ideologised transformation, whose effects come back now as haunting 
challenges for the consolidation phase of democratization. Doubtless, such echoism 
has helped in terms of legitimising transformation, but it has also contributed to its 
process and outcome malaise. The model of system transformation in the Balkan 
countries is a radical and simultaneous transformation, in terms of the speed of 
                                                                                                                                                     
transformation, followed by the consolidation of the regime as the most time and energy demanding 
phase of the system transformation. The two stages of system transformation in the Balkans are 
considered to have been successfully finalised, while the last one proved quite challenging and highly 
demanding, expected to be concluded yet. On the other side, some of the scholars divide the system 
transformation process into two phases: the collapse of former regime and installation of democratic 
institution as they call it first transition, then the second transition including the phase of consolidation 
(Valenzuela, 1992; O’Donnell, 1993): World Development, vol. 21, n.8, 1355-70. This system 
transformation is categorised under the third wave of democratization which started in Spain in 1974 
(Huntington, 1991, 44). The Third Wave: Taking into account the roots and type of the system 
transformation it could have been counted as a fourth wave. (von Beyme, 1994). However, there was 
no reverse wave (“a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within 
a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during 
that period of time” (Huntington, 1991, 15) in between, which it could mark a new wave of 
democratization. 
3 The democratic requirements according to minimalist conceptions, of course, were easy attainable, 
but not sufficient and compatible with transformation expectations. Societies emerging from former 
communist regimes in Balkans, despite their uncompromised will for freedom, possessed no structures 
conducive for democracy development. Moreover, they had little, or not all, experience with 
democracy. Therefore, preparing societies for democracy, in terms of social structure developments, 
and teaching democracy to them was of essential importance for democratic development and 
democratization process. This approach could have brought the people at the main focus to get along 
with democratic structures, in terms of creation of the public will, opinion, and institutional decision 
making in general, and citizen participation which lay at the heart of democracy. It could make 
democracy consolidation in Balkans visible. Yet, the actor and agent oriented theoretical approach has 
not primarily hub at the people and masses, which in itself sounds, if not undemocratic, at least a 
minimalist one. 
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transformation, and simultaneous in terms of the width, encompassing entire 
transformation starting from its polity, economy and society. The paper argues that, 
the way and the model of transformation applied has compromised the system 
transformation process, in terms of modus operandi, as well as outcomes, making it 
unmatched with the intended and expected transformation results, though entering 
into the third decade since system transition started. It proves that the 
transformation approach is not suitable and compatible with socio-economic 
structural circumstances of Balkan countries, resembling an effort of sailing a dried 
out place. The democratic consolidation in the Balkan post-communist countries is 
still waiting to take place in substantial meaning of democracy, having citizens at its 
focus.  
 
The paper has its shortcomings as well, but it aims to put light on the root causes of 
malaise democratization process in Balkans. It could have been further enriched by 
bringing the data about privatization process and social structure indicators. 
However, the paper is more of theoretical rather than empirical nature.  
 
 
Neoliberal Shock Therapy Model Of System Transformation in the Balkans 
 
Eastern Europe and Balkans as well opted, or were asked to, for a radical and 
simultaneous system transformation. This raised the concerns of various scholars 
about doability and quality of the process. The idea of Elster (1990), later called by 
Offe (1991) as dilemma of simultaneity, raising doubts on the capacity of states and 
societies to move along with rapid transformation in all dimensions at the same 
time, doability in terms of the functioning of such transformation, and institutional 
and structural bearability of the transformation. The “shock therapy” way of radical 
economic change necessitated the jump form an extreme left to an extreme right 
spectrum in economic terms, from a command economy to free market economy. A 
model which in reality produced a lot of shocks in the quality of transition and 
democracy generally attained so far. Was there an alternative to shock therapy, to 
leap from an extreme to another one? Doubtless, yes. Were Balkan states and 
societies able to choose among the alternatives? Actually, not. System 
transformation to a large extent was a feature of a snow ball effect, or as a domino 
transition implying the role of external causes of transition, alongside the domestic 
demands for change. Internally, the societies’ preparedness to take part in deciding 
their fate by choosing the path of system transformation was not there. Actually, 
celebrating the collapse of the regimes among Balkan societies took priority over 
the social concerns about the path of system transformation, its future prospects and 
possible products of each alternative path chosen. In this regard, also the institutions 
of societal participation through which social will could be developed, at the time 
were not built to an extent of emancipating and articulating the will of “well 
informed” societies about possible modalities of system transformation. At the 
external level, referring to the role of international community in the transition 
process, and its promotion of values of democracy, liberalism, and free market 
economy, it was believed that the righteous way for system transformation should 
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be the shock therapy model, as part of neoliberal policy. While talking about the 
role of EC/EU as one of the main players within the international community and its 
free market values, it should be pointed out that some of the member states adhere 
to a form of welfare rather than pure free market system. Yet, the EC/EU itself 
promotes the values of free market economy, constituted in the Maastricht Treaty, 
Draft Constitution and Reform Treaty of Lisbon. It was the EU itself rather than its 
member states specifically that dealt directly with former socialist states of Europe, 
including Balkans, through EU enlargement policy. This radical model of transition 
is used for the first time in the democratization history in case of post-communist 
Europe, intending to produce a functional democracy and pure free market society 
simultaneously, within short period of time, transformations that took decades and 
century for western democracies. What is more important here, no room for 
alternative model and policies was left to states and societies concerned, to chose 
other than the shock therapy and neoliberal approach. They carried on radical and 
simultaneous transformations in all dimensions, regardless of its possible 
democratic outcomes. It seems that not democracy, but pure free market economy 
was of primary importance, which somehow contradicts with the idea of 
simultaneity itself. This was either due to incompatibility, and the power of market 
to surpass democracy, or intentionally it was meant democracy to serve the pure 
free market purposes. Now, understandably the quality of democracy has been 
compromised by the neoliberal policies pursued at the same time during transition. 
As the system transformation started off, reasonably the dilemma of simultaneity 
was puzzled with enthusiasm of transition, not interrogated or disputed neither at 
the institutional nor society level, but it was rather perceived as the only and the 
right way to move on with transition. Some of the scholarly concerns (Elster, 1990; 
Offe, 1991) were also not much considered due to enthusiasm of transition and due 
to the fact that this was externally promoted. However, with time, as transformation 
is being prolonged, enthusiasm draining out, and the gap between intended and real 
outputs widening consistently, the concerns about such model of system 
transformation and its outputs are consistently raised out among the academic 
community, though still considerably ignored. There is a wide perception that 
democracy Balkan societies are experiencing now is not what they have expected, 
or that they still waiting for real democracy to take place. One of the explanations 
that is loosing its argument on timely basis is that the delays and inabilities of 
democracies to deliver in terms of citizens and society interest protection, is because 
the transition process has not been yet completed and takes time. Or, it seems that 
the major concern, even by international sponsors of democracy in the Balkans, it 
has been transition, not really consolidation. 
 
Nonetheless, the roots of this system transformation failure, if I might call it so 
since it has not so far produced the intended results, come out to be the issue of 
simultaneity and radical economic reforms. The incompatibility of simultaneous 
transformation is compromising the quality of transformation end result, producing 
a sort of authoritarian electoralism instead of real democracy, privatization of 
politics through corrugation of public sphere, consequently increasing the level of 
informalities which challenges the institutional stateness of the Balkan states and 
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indirectly democracy itself, opening the possibility of those few more powerful to 
carry on their interest at the expense of the majority powerless and easily 
manipulated. Such development makes democracy transformation roll back more 
likely, or if not due to international community insistence, it keeps democracy to a 
level of an authoritarian electoralism, or simply democracy without citizens, since it 
leaves the citizens and society at the periphery of decision-making system, basically 
resembling the place of citizen in the former regime, featured with monopolisation 
of power. The only obvious development appears to be the shift of power from a 
monopoly to an arranged oligopoly system. Furthermore, in the case of the Balkan 
system transformation, this is happening due to incompatibility of simultaneous 
transition and the priority given, though externally driven, to economic transition 
through shock therapy, as part of neoliberalism, over democracy, meant to stimulate 
democracy development as well. Yet, it brought democracy under the shadow of the 
economic liberalism – of neoliberal type, different even from classical economic 
liberalism in which the state has still some regulatory power. Likewise, the concept 
of democracy within the system transformation was conceptualized on the 
neoliberal lenses and framework, being primarily elite oriented, of sceptical value 
about society’s ability to participate, principally serving the economic elites. 
Moreover, it did not take into account the few and interrupted experiences of 
Balkan societies with democracy, which principally implies the essential that 
transformation should have been meant, among others, also to teach democracy 
among Balkan societies as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation.  
 
 
Neoliberal Concept of Democracy And Implication for Balkan System 
Transformation 
 
Neoliberalism (von Hayek, 1981; von Hayek, 2003; Friedman, 1982; Saad-Filho 
and Johnston, 2005) as an ideology and project has its own view of democracy, 
largely developed from realist and pragmatic point of view. Neoliberals rely on 
economic theories of democracy considerably taking form elitist theories, primarily 
on the classical works of Schumpeter (1947) and Downs (1957). It is very important 
to enlighten the concept of democracy according to neoliberalism, because it helps 
to explain the type of democracy that is emerging in the Balkan states, based on 
neoliberal spirit. The scepticism of economic elitist theories of democracy about the 
ability and readiness of people to participate in politics is dominating the current 
trend of democratization in the Balkans, and it is promoted even by international 
sponsors of democracy. Schumpeter doubted on the ability and readiness of masses 
to participate, referring to the lack of information, time and the will among citizens 
to participate. He gave importance to competition among the elites as determinant 
of democracy, and people participation in elections making up their mind to decide 
on election among the offers provided by the elites competing among themselves. 
His concept of democracy presents democracy more as a method, different from its 
original sense, limiting the sovereignty of citizens to the power to choose among the 
elites, but not to participate in the building of public and society will supposed to be 
articulated on elites’ offers to citizens during elections. In general his concept of 
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democracy bring into being a minimalist democracy, hardly matching the 
substantial meaning and purpose of democracy. The idea was furthered by Downs 
(1957) applying economic principles in the theories of democracy, conceptualising 
human being as homo oeconomicus and perceiving democracy as a market relying 
on decisions based on cost-benefit calculations. In the same spirit has also been 
developed the rational choice approach and public choice theory, with foundations 
on the elitist and economic principles. These neoliberal theories conceptualise 
democracy in such a way that makes democracy a mean rather than an aim to free 
market development. It produces an economised society, in the narrow sense of 
numeric and statistical principles of economics. Essentially, such concept of 
democracy is incompatible with the true meaning, sense and purpose of democracy. 
According to the meaning of origin, democracy should have citizens at the focus. In 
contrary, neoliberal theories are primarily concerned with the capital rather than 
welfare, with the elites - in particular economic elites rather than society in general, 
with the narrow particularistic interest rather than general public interest of society. 
In a democracy, if that is to be called a democracy, perceived as a market where 
everyone acts based on cost-benefit analysis, the most capable to act and protect 
their own interests are those more powerful, the most powerful in a pure (capitalist), 
neoliberal, free market system are the economic elites. Neoliberalism transforms 
democracy from a system where everyone is free to pursue their own interests, into 
a system where those capable will pursue their interests. Based on this logic, 
citizens and society do not participate in the building of the social will which is a 
backbone of democracy. Moreover, it produces undemocratic and unrepresentative 
institutions. The “social will” is created and promoted by political institutions 
superficially flying above society, such as political parties with low level and 
intensity of social integration and mobilisation, without mass participation, and 
open to pressures and influences form economic elites which are more powerful. 
The offers of political parties are meant to be sold to electorate, though not created 
by electorate themselves, as true meaning of democracy requires. Balkan political 
parties mostly offer candidates, but not real policies. This appears to be largely due 
to lack of space for alternative development, due to unquestionable dominance of 
neoliberal policies, making party offers poor one and inconsistent with normative 
party functions. Likewise, parties use variety of means from PR companies, 
advertisings, and media to make their products more attractive to easily manipulated 
masses. In other words, political parties, with low mass participation rates, develop 
programmes outside the masses, in order to maximise their profit – win election, but 
do not win elections to carry on politics. Not paying much attention to the mass 
participation, which is the key to a substantial democracy, is damaging key 
elements of democracy, the essential institutions for representative democracy, the 
institutions of accountability and responsibility. In a democracy where the 
institution of accountability is not up to the expected level, or does not exist at all 
then it is hard to talk of democracy. This makes degeneration of democracy 
unavoidable, and if that persist it brings de-democratization for democracies and 
never attaining real democracy for transition countries. The only possible way to 
develop democratic horizontal and vertical accountability is through mass 
participation. Yet, we saw that neoliberalism does not provide space, and does not 
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have even the intention, for mass participation. Furthermore, the mass participation 
is considered as a threat to economic elites’ interest, as a threat to the primary 
concern of neoliberalism. In a way, neoliberal model of system transformation is 
not conducive to the development of democratic accountability and to democracy in 
general. This puts a light into the inability of Balkan parliaments to hold 
accountable the executives and public agencies, because the society can not hold 
accountable the parliaments. In other words, the chain of democratic accountability 
is cut and do not function. Yet, the only thing that makes representative 
democracies a real democracy is the accountability structure.  
 
Referring to Balkan transformation system, the actual lack of democratic spirit and 
feeble democratic institutions in its real meaning is the result of the promotion of 
democracy on the neoliberal terms and neoliberal concept of democracy, as 
explained above, setting the state and the fate of democracy in the Balkans in the 
flux und unstable condition. The only viable democratic institution is elections, 
though largely frail because of the lack of pillars of democracy such as 
accountability. This has brought the whole idea of democracy rounded on elections. 
Therefore even the supposed election effect on democracy and democratic 
development seems to have degenerated further from a “stop and go effect” to a 
“just go effect”. Election alone do not suffice, though minimalists claim the 
opposite. Therefore, the alleviation of the importance of the institution of 
accountability in the democratization process in Balkan states has its roots in 
neoliberal model of transition. Nonetheless, such as an approach of democratisation 
guarantees no successful completion of the process. Indeed, it makes the process 
roll back more likely. In practical terms, it raises uncertainty about sustainability of 
such democracies relying solely on elitist institutions, undermining the importance 
and place citizens should have in a democracy. Can democracy be legitimised as 
such, which is crucial for democracy consolidation of the transition countries? Of 
course, largely democracies in the Balkans have been legitimized in enthusiastic 
way and externally since supported by western democracies and international 
institutions such as IMF and World Bank, and the EU where Balkan countries 
pertain to be integrated. However, while talking about externally legitimation, it 
should be pointed out that the EU integration is largely playing its role as 
democratiser of the Balkans, through enlargement policy, spelt out in the 
membership criteria, Copenhagen criteria. Yet, looking at the requirements of the 
membership criteria, one finds out that the requirements are quite of neoliberal 
nature, largely focusing on electoral process of democracy through which 
democracy is measured, not paying much attention to the fundamental principles of 
democracy such as: public creation of the social will, public creation of the opinion, 
deliberation and alternative thinking, and what is more crucial citizen participation4.  
                                                          
4 For instance political parties are not asked to develop their inner democracy to widen mass 
participation. Mainly, the focus is on the election. Thus, the lack of fundamental principles of 
democracy as root causes of consistent sink of democratic behaviours and attitudes during election 
process in the Balkan democratisation states is not of concern by the EU. The role of EU in the process 
can be treated separately, and is not our concern here, but I just briefly mentioned it, since Balkan 
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The Quality of Democratization in the Balkans 
 
The promotion and development of democracy in the Balkan transformation 
countries is being done through the neoliberal lenses, confining the aims and limits 
of democracy development prospects. This has transformed the democratization 
process into pretty ideologised in itself, shaping the type and quality democracy 
should be developed.  
 
Therefore, some of the shortcomings in the democracy development appear not to 
be of a nature of time requirements, but rather as not intended and pursued at all, 
laying outside the neoliberal framework of democracy and democratisation. 
Creation of democratic society that should have served as a safe divan for 
democracy and democracy development was not in the priorities of the agenda of 
democratisation. The most viable social structure that could stabilize, enroot and 
consolidate democracy is a society with a solid middle class (Lipset, 1959; Lipset 
et.al., 1993; Rueschemeyer, et.al., 1992) that enables mass participation, widens 
social integration in the political process and accordingly develops and 
functionalises accountable institutions indispensible for democracy. Social 
participation and integration fuels democratic accountability to check and control 
consistently the vitality and quality of democracy in line with its fundamental 
principles. Yet, one of the major defects of Balkan democracies is the lack of 
accountability, as a result of low level of social integration in the political process, 
actually making Balkan democracies degenerate und unable to deliver in terms of 
attaining democracy objectives, primarily promoting citizens’ interests. From the 
neoliberal perspective, accountability has minimalist electorally sufficed 
expectations. 
 
Young and not yet consolidated democracies are in desperate needs for legitimacy. 
Despite externally driven legitimation, which might somehow fill the gap of 
legitimacy for short period of time, the most reliable democracy legitimation is 
ensured only through society wide participation and integration. The current 
developments and shock therapy radical reforms in the Balkan societies have 
created and produced a social structures with very unjust distribution of wealth, 
concentrating most of the wealth on few, while leaving the majority to oscillate 
between poverty and absolute poverty line, in particular through high rates of 
unemployment caused by “privatise now, everything” strategy pushed forward by 
the shock therapy model of system transformation. This brought Balkan post-
communist states into what O’Donnell (1993) calls it a fast social inequalisation of 
society, constructing social structures not promising for democratic stability. The 
wealth distribution is closely linked with the possibilities and opportunities for 
democratic participation and society integration in the political process, normatively 
aimed by democracy. The current wealth distribution structure ensures the 
neoliberal spirit of democratic participation and integration, including economic 
                                                                                                                                                     
democratisation is for the most part externally reliant, especially on the EU promoting democracy on 
the neoliberal spirit. 
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elite mobilisation, but excluding social mobilisation. In such type of minimalist 
democratic structures, economic interests have unconstrained power to carry on 
with their economic interests, though often incompatible with the public interest of 
society. Such a narrow concept of participation shrinks the idea of democracy to a 
sort of an elitist democracy being consolidated, a democracy without citizens.  
 
Hence, it became obvious that the process of democratisation in Balkans was not on 
the right track to produce a conducive environment for democratic consolidation. 
This social structure is reflected in the feeble democraticability and functionality of 
democratic structures and institutions, supposed to serve as pillars of democracy: 
parliamentarism, political parties, civil society, public sphere, democratic creation 
of the public will and opinion, the media and other likely channels of representation. 
So far Balkan democracies are characterised with weak parliamentarism, reflecting 
the slash on the chain of representation and accountability due to low level and 
intensity of participation and integration set by the actual social structures is not 
contributing to democracy development, but rather is producing undemocratic 
institutions of representation such as actual political parties, supposed to fill the 
seats of the parliament and reflect the will of society as the most powerful 
institution of democracy. Political parties in Balkan democracies still build up 
parliaments, but since they lack inner democracies they serve as cut chain of 
representation and accountability, prone to and open to carry on particularistic 
interests and represent the few. Thus parliaments look like a reflection of the will of 
economic elites rather than of society, though they periodically and routinely obtain 
the blessing of society during elections. Yet, elections do not suffice, especially 
with the development of various sophisticated methods and pour of huge amounts 
of money to shape the preferences and make up the mind of voters. Likewise, 
parliaments are not really depended on the will of society. Moreover, parliaments of 
Balkan countries were often needed as rubber stamp to carry on neoliberal policies 
in contrary to society’s public interest, especially in case of privatisation, and it was 
very easy since parliaments in the Balkan states rarely reflect the wish of masses 
and rarely do vote in society accountability spirit. There was no need to ignore the 
parliament and make outside parliamentary decisions, as neoliberals often do, since 
parliaments largely were prone to pressures form small powerful interest groups 
favouring such neoliberal policies. The argument that parties are hold accountable 
periodically during elections, which is the most minimalist requirement of 
democracy, does not appear to function, since undemocratic parties and small 
interest groups control the means of creation of public opinion, especially the media 
largely used to manipulate masses rather than provide alternative sources of 
information as their democratic moral obligation. The neoliberal approach of 
democratisation seems to have intentionally missed one of the fundamental aims of 
democracy and democratization, the emancipation of society, in particular Balkans 
societies having no healthy experience with democracy previously. Political parties 
as vital institutions of democracy among others, placed between state and society 
are normatively entrusted with social mobilisation through which they emancipate 
the society. However, political parties of Balkan democracies somehow, tough 
poorly, are trying to learn form the experience of consolidated democratic societies, 
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which to a certain degree are moving towards a postdemocratic arrangement, using 
the modern means of campaign to set up the minds of voters as they wish, and 
marketing strategies to sell the offers of vital public interest like the one used to sell 
bath towels. In this direction, civil society is considered as one of the most 
important pieces of healthy democracy, mobilising and integrating the society into 
political process (Putnam, 1993). It is closely related with public space (Habermas, 
1992), wider the public space more breathe would be for civil society. It is also one 
of the most important components to measure the functionality of democracies. 
Balkan democracies are known for flimsy civil society, often used as a cosmetic of 
the system rather than a powerful voice and milieu of social will mobilisation. Most 
of the organisations such as NGOs within the frame of civil society are established 
to raise funds for private and particularistic purposes, putting themselves into a 
clientalist structure with the donors among them government. Often real civil 
society empowerment might be considered as a threat to the power of economic 
interest groups. In particular workers’ unions so far have proved to be useless and 
unable to promote and mobilise workers interests. The source of this can be 
explained referring to the neoliberal model of democratization, which does not have 
in its agenda the empowerment of civil society in particular workers unions. The 
trend of transformation in Balkans does not look favourable to empowerment of 
civil society and consequently slander public space as required by democratic 
standards. The consolidation of Balkan democracies through empowerment of civil 
society and widening of the public space does not appear in the agenda of system 
transformation and logically it should not be expected to be developed. However, it 
does not mean that Balkan democracies have no civil societies. They do have, but 
they are not functional. Likewise, the explanation that the inability of civil society 
to carry on its agenda is not due to instability of transition process, which seems to 
be a never ending, but rather due to the fact that it is not in the agenda to be 
developed al all, and as such it correlates with the low level of social participation 
and integration, justified by the economic elitist theories of democracy. Often 
neoliberals perceive the majority principle of democracy as a threat, since it enables 
the mass participation and empowers them with the ability to limit the private 
property, competition, and free market economy. From the neoliberal point of view 
democracy is acceptable as long as it does not touch the pure free market economy 
(Ptak., 2002). 
 
Thus, the feeble democratic structures in the Balkan states appear as a result of 
neoliberal model of system transformation. Democracy is used as a mean to achieve 
pure free market economy, instead of being the opposite. The end products of 
system transformation in Balkans so far are the type of democracies known as 
electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006) or delegative democracy (O’Donnell, 
1994) attributed as noninstitutionalised poliarchy. The voters have the possibility to 
choose among authoritarians, since elections bring no policy change and no more 
democracy. It has ended up into electoralisation of democracy, bringing to the 
focus elections as number of votes rather than citizens. The authoritarian values, 
attitudes and behaviours as outcome of dogmatic system transformation and the lack 
of freedom to think of alternatives, are largely evident. This elucidates also the 
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dearth of political programmes offered by political parties, having not much space 
for alternatives, able to choose starting from neoliberal up to neoliberal policies.  
 
The Implication of Neoliberal System Transformation into Stateness  
 
The state as a unit of political organization of the social will is a reflection of 
society impacted by and impacting society as well, in terms of organizations, 
orientations, and expectations. As such the societal milieu is decisive about the 
nature of the state in terms of stateness, ability to fulfill its obligations, which in 
turn is decisive for the prospect of democracy. At the heart of neoliberal ideology 
stands the slim state (Harvey, 2005). The role of neoliberal state is merely the 
implementation of agreements and protection from robbery, violence and cheating 
(Nozick, 1976). In other words the ultimate goal of the state is to keep the order of 
private property in a free market economy, or to ensure free market system. This is 
known as a minimalist concept of state, since it constitutes one among various state 
responsibilities. However, the concept of state as an organisation of the public will 
within specific territory (O’Donnell, 1993), apparently stands not in line with the 
neoliberal ideology that tries to reduce and confine the publicness within the scope 
of the expression of economic interests. The tiny role attributed to the state has to 
do with ensuring economic interests, not necessary the interest of public in general 
has repercussion for democratic development, and is not compatible with the 
ultimate goal of democracy. Almost all Balkan states concerned here are considered 
new states, since some of them were created recently during system transformation 
process and some others, though created long time ago, could not inherit from the 
state structure of the communist regimes in term of governing structures. 
Democracies function and are governed differently from former regimes. Therefore, 
those states have weak stateness in need of further strengthening. In contrary, the 
neoliberal approach in the democratization process in the Balkans, while perceiving 
states as a threat and trying to make them as slim as possible, has produced weak 
states, if not to say failed states.  
 
The best way to make slender states was meant to use privatisation of almost 
everything implemented by shock therapy model. Yet, the experience of Balkan 
democracies with shock therapy privatization so far proved dysfunctional. It ended 
up into what O’Donnell (1993) calls it perverse privatisation. The push for rapid all 
encompassing privatisation was uncompromiseable and dogmatic, regardless of its 
outputs. The state had to reach its thinness, so that economic elites would need to 
pay less for the state, and they can easily control it. Taking into account the lack of 
accountability institutions, explained above, privatisation has made easier the 
intertwine between political elites, entrusted as democratising actors, and economic 
elites, trying to make use of privatisation for particularistic interests, as it is actually 
the case with the privatisation process and outcomes in the Balkans. This has 
triggered the development of state capture behaviours (Grzymala-Busse, 2008, 
628), and later attitudes as well, among the political and economic elites’ 
interpenetration, sustaining each other. What is more important to be stressed here, 
while intending to make the state more functional, slim, and effective through 
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privatization, meant to prevent the political elites from the use of the state for their 
own private benefit, in reality it happened just the opposite, political elites 
themselves or in arrangement with economic elites, privatised the public wealth and 
property for themselves, transferring the property from public to their private hands, 
for a cost of almost nothing. In a way, it could not make possible the detraction of 
the public wealth from the hands of politicians, in contrary it made them owners or 
shareholders of former public wealth and property, where citizens claim no rights 
on it anymore. As a consequence, form the democratic perspective, politically it 
blurred further the boundaries between narrow private interests of elites and the 
public interest, defined on the way elites wished to, leaving the publicness under the 
shadow of private narrow interest. It has led basically to high level of 
personalisation of politics, or presidentialisation of politics (Poguntke and Webb 
2007), which stands contrary to fundamental principles of representative 
democracy. It downgrades further the freedom and ability of democratic 
participation, widens and deepens the poverty among society, and opens the way for 
easily votebuying institution development, which is quite obvious and increasing 
among Balkan democracies. Moreover, it leads to undemocratic behaviour feature 
of Balkan democracies, such as overempowered executives, considered as 
vetoactors in the democratic consolidation structure. 
 
Generally, this is shaping weak, or almost failed, rather than slim states as it was 
primarily intended. Feeble states unable to reflect the public will and to look after it, 
from the governing point of view, empowering executives with authoritarian 
tendencies, often surpass the will of majority in favour of few particularistic 
interests. This is best illustrated in the helplessness of Balkan states to functionalise 
the rule of law. While regarding the democratic prospects of such state 
arrangements, according to Merkel theory of democratization (Merkel, 2007), those 
authoritarian executives are considered as veto players in the democratization 
process. The only way to bring them under the rule of law is through empowering 
the society participation in the democratic process, which seems not to be in line 
with the current democratization agenda in the Balkans. States that can not enforce 
their legality all over equally among all citizens, regardless of their economic status, 
promotes a sort of democracy of low intensity citizenship, opening the way for 
development of so called clientelist rather than citizen democracy. Any meaning of 
democracy avoid of fundamental elements of citizenship, the autonomy and basic 
equality required for participation, does not make sense.  
 
Thus, the nature of the states emerging during system transformation in the Balkan 
states, which fits to the concept of schizophrenic state (O’Donnell, G., 1993) – 
having mixture of authoritarian and democratic elements, confirms Polanyi’s 
worries (Harvey, 2005) that neoliberal order can be sustained only by resort to 
authoritarianism, restricting the freedom of the masses in favour of the freedom of 
the few. For sure, authoritarian affinities in the Balkans are extensively present and 
growing consistently.  
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Conclusion 
 
Balkan post-communist countries are following the path of system transformation 
based on neoliberal model. It pushed for simultaneous and rapid transformation 
affecting largely the state and society levels pertaining to quality of democracy 
acquired so far and democracy consolidation process and outcomes. So far, 
simultaneous developments of the system transformation appear to have given 
priority to economic transformation of neoliberal type, not in line with society 
democratic expectations, compromising the democracy quality and consolidation 
prospects. Initially, such incompatibility of simultaneity was not a theme due to 
enthusiasm of system transformation. Yet, the more the enthusiasm dries out and 
the more prolonged the completion of consolidation of democracy, more obvious 
would be the wrong path of the Balkan system transformation.  
 
 
References 
 
Elster, J., 1990. The necessity and impossibility of simultaneous economic and 
political reform. In: Ploszajski, P., (ed.), 1990. Philosophy of social choice. 
Warsaw: IFiS Publishers.  
Friedman, M., 1982. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
Grzymala-Busse, A., 2008. Beyond clientelism – incumbent state capture and state 
formation. In: Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5) 
Harvey, D., 2005. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Huntington, S. P., 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth 
century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.  
Lipset, S. M., 1959. Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development 
and political legitimacy. In: American Political Science Review, 53 (1), 69-105.  
Lipset, S. M., et. al., 1993. A comparative analysis of the social requisites of 
democracy. In: International Journal of Science, 45 (2), 155 – 176 
Merkel, W., 1999. Systemtransformation, eine Einführung in die Teorie und 
Empirie der Transformationsforshung. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.  
Merkel, W., 2007. Gegen Alle Theorie? Die Konsolidierung der Demokratie in 
Ostmitteleuropa. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 48(3), 413-433 
 
O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. C., ed. 1986. Transitions from authoritarian rule: 
tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press.  
O’Donnell, G., 1993. On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems 
(a Latin American view with glances at some post-communist countries). In: World 
Development, 21(8), 1355-70 
Offe, C., 1991. Capitalism by democratic design? Democratic theory facing the 
triple transition in Eastern Central Europe. In: Social Research, 54(4): 865 - 892 
                                                             IBAC 2012 vol.1  
 
 
72 
 
Przeworski, A., 1986. Some problems in the study of the transition democracy. In: 
O’Donnell, G. et.al., ed. Transitions from authoritarian rule: Comparative 
perspectives. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Poguntke, T. and Webb, P., ed. 2007. The presidentialization of politics: A 
comparative study of modern democracies. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Przeworski, A., 1991. Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Putnam, R. D., 1993. Making democracy work: Civic tradition in modern Italy. 
Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press,  
Pye, L.W., 1990. Political sciences and the crisis of authoritarianism. In: American 
Political Science Review, 84 (1), 3 – 19 
Rueschemeyer, D. et.al. 1992. Capitalist development and democracy. New York: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Saad-Filho, A. and Johnston, D., ed. 2005. Neoliberalism: A critical reader. Pluto 
Press, London 
Schedler, A., 2006. Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Valenzuela, S. J., 1992. Democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings: 
notion, process, and facilitating condition. In: Mainwaring, S. et.al., ed. Issues in 
democratic consolidation, South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press.  
von Beyme, K., 1994. Systemwechsel in Osteuropa. Frankfurt a. M. 
von Hayek, F. A., 1979. Wissneschaft und Sozialismus. Tübingen 
von Hayek, F. A., 1981. Recht, Gesetzgebung und Freiheit. Eine neue Darstellung 
der liberalen  
Prinzipien der Gerechtigkeit und der politischen Ökonomie. Landsberg am Lech 
von Hayek, F.A., 2003. Der Weg zur Knechtschaft. München 
  
